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THE UNTIMELY DEATH OF THE ON-SALE BAR TO 
PATENTABILITY 
Daniel J. Kim* 
I. INTRODUCTION
You are an inventor that has just created a brand-new, state-of-the-
art widget that you are trying to get to market.  Before you can 
manufacture and sell your product, you need investors to fund your 
commercial enterprise.  While you are soliciting funding, one of your 
potential investors seems very interested in your product, so much so 
that he offers to buy one, just to be the first one to own such a novel 
invention. 
You oblige, but not wanting to bring it to market without the 
appropriate funding, you make him sign a nondisclosure agreement, 
secreting the sale behind closed doors. 
Soon after, a recession hits, and your prospects for funding drop to 
an all-time low.  With no funding and no publicity for your product, 
you begrudgingly table the idea of bringing this amazing invention to 
market. 
Four years later, the economy picks back up and you are 
approached by one of those old investors, who wishes to fund your 
endeavor.  It becomes an instant success, selling millions of units 
within the first month.  
At this point, you realize that you should probably protect your and 
your investor’s investments.  You have heard about patents, which 
should do just that, so you schedule an appointment with a patent 
attorney and sit down as a prospective client.  You tell the attorney 
about your invention and about your huge commercial success. 
Among other things, the attorney asks when you first sold the 
invention.  He talks about something called the “on-sale bar,” which 
bars from patentability inventions sold over a year before filing an 
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application for patent.1  Suddenly, you remember that potential 
investor that you sold your invention to four years ago. 
You are stuck in a precarious position: if you admit that you sold 
your invention over a year ago, you will not be able to protect your 
significant costs in setting up the operation.  However, you figure, the 
chances of getting caught are astronomically low.  If you lie, only 
you and that one buyer would know about it.  Any risk analysis 
would suggest that lying is the better option.  However, is that how it 
should be?2 
The on-sale bar to patentability prevents an inventor from patenting 
an invention if the invention was placed on sale anytime over a year 
before filing the patent application.3  This bar is rarely enforced 
because the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
lacks the resources to discover prior sales.4  In addition, 
administrative proceedings that can be initiated by third parties are 
either inapplicable or limited in scope.5  Finally, a patent infringer’s 
affirmative defense of inequitable conduct, which would render a 
patent unenforceable where the owner deceived the USPTO during 
the application process, has an unduly high burden of proof as it 
applies to the on-sale bar.6  Altogether, the on-sale bar has become an 
ineffective feature in the patent system to protect inventions in the 
public domain.7  However, the on-sale bar is an essential feature in 
the patent system because it helps promote the progress of useful arts 
while allowing inventors to make informed choices regarding the sale 
of the invention.8  
This Comment will first discuss the features of the on-sale bar.9 
Next, in Part III, it will discuss why the on-sale bar is a necessary 
feature in the patent system.10  In Part IV, it will discuss why the on-
sale bar is inadequately enforced.11  In Part V, it will discuss potential 
1. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2015).
2. This ethical dilemma is not limited to startup businesses.  See, e.g., Special Devices,
Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“OEA did not disclose [the
commercial sale of 20,000 units of the claimed invention] . . . to the Patent and
Trademark Office.”).
3. § 102(a)–(b).
4. See infra Section IV.A.
5. See infra Section IV.B.
6. See infra Section IV.C.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
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changes to the patent system to better suit enforcement of the on-sale 
bar.12 
In order to improve the on-sale bar while balancing the interests of 
inventors and the public, (1) non-public sales should be excluded 
from the bar,13 (2) third parties should be allowed to submit more 
information on prior sales during post-grant proceedings before the 
USPTO,14 and (3) the inequitable conduct defense should have a 
lower standard for prior sales.15 
II. WHAT IS THE ON-SALE BAR?
The on-sale bar is one of the ways that Congress has implemented 
the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution.16 
It creates a balance between the inventor’s desire to sell an invention 
and the government’s interest in public disclosure of new 
inventions.17  It does so by preventing an inventor from patenting an 
invention if the invention was placed on sale more than one year 
before the filing date of its patent application.18  This grace period 
allows an inventor to test the commercial viability of an invention 
before pursuing a patent.19 
The on-sale bar was not always codified in statute.20  In the 1829 
case Pennock v. Dialogue, the invention in the dispute, an 
“improvement in the art of making leather tubes or hose,” had been 
on sale for up to seven years before the inventor patented the 
invention.21  In invalidating the patent, the Supreme Court relied on 
the requirement that an invention be “not known or used by the 
12. See infra Part V.
13. See infra Part V.
14. See infra Part VI.
15. See infra Part VII.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that Congress shall have the power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries”)
17. See Stephen Bruce Lindholm, Comment, Revisiting Pfaff and the On-Sale Bar, 15
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 213, 215 (2004).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (b)(1) (2015).
19. Lindholm, supra note 17.
20. See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 2 Pet. 1 (1829).
21. Id. at 3, 2 Pet. at 1, 11 (“The invention . . . was completed in 1811; and the letters
patent were obtained in 1818.  In this interval, upwards of thirteen thousand feet of
hose, . . . had been made and sold . . . .”).
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public, before the application.”22  It reasoned that “the progress of 
science and useful arts” would be “materially retard[ed]” if the 
system allowed an inventor to delay patenting until “the danger of 
competition should force him to secure the exclusive right.”23 
The on-sale bar was eventually codified in the Patent Act of 1836.24 
This version of the on-sale bar included two distinct features.25  First, 
the on-sale bar applied if the invention was sold at any time before 
applying for a patent.26  Second, it required the applicant’s consent to 
the sale.27  Both of these features would eventually be modified in 
subsequent versions of the on-sale bar.28 
Three years later, the Patent Act of 1839 removed the requirement 
that the invention be sold with the applicant’s consent.29  It also 
added a two-year grace period, which allowed an inventor to sell an 
invention before applying for a patent for that invention.30  In 1939, 
Congress reduced the grace period from two years to one year.31 
In 1998, the Court instituted a two-prong test for determining 
whether the on-sale bar applied.32  These elements are questions of 
law.33  First, the invention must be the subject of a commercial sale 
or offer for sale,34 as defined by “[g]eneral principles of contract 
law.”35  
The second requirement in the two-prong test is that “the invention 
must be ready for patenting.”36  The Court has held that this 
requirement can be met in at least two ways: first, “by proof of 
reduction to practice,” or second, by “descriptions . . . sufficiently 
22. Id. at 19, 2 Pet. at 13 (interpreting the Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318,
318–19 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.)).
23. Id.
24. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (codified as amended in scattered




28. See infra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
29. See The Driven-Well Cases, 123 U.S. 267, 271, 276 (1887).
30. Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353, 354 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 
102, 271 (2015)).
31. Act of Aug. 5, 1939, ch. 452, 53 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 102
(2015)).
32. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998).
33. Meds. Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 827 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
34. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67.
35. Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A]
completed sale requires an offer, an acceptance, and consideration.”).
36. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67.
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specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the 
invention.”37 
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), passed in 2011, 
modified 35 U.S.C. § 102, the statute containing the on-sale bar.38 
Under the AIA, § 102 now prevents patentability if “the claimed 
invention was . . . in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the 
public” more than one year from the filing date of the patent 
application.39  This addition of the language “or otherwise available 
to the public” has created debate on whether a sale must be public in 
order to trigger the on-sale bar:40  the word “otherwise” suggests that 
the on-sale and public-use bars to patentability must also require that 
the invention was made available to the public.41 
A sale is non-public if it is performed under conditions of 
secrecy.42  For instance, sales subject to a nondisclosure agreement 
would likely constitute a non-public sale.43  Prior to the AIA, non-
public sales could trigger the on-sale bar.44  However, under the AIA, 
the answer to whether non-public sales can trigger the on-sale bar is 
unknown.45 
The history of the on-sale bar displays a careful balancing act 
between the needs of the inventor and the interests of the 
government.46  In addition, the history describes a desire to simplify 
and streamline conclusions of law and findings of fact, creating a 
37. Id. at 67–68.
38. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
39. Id. sec. 3, § 102(a)(1), (b)(1) (emphasis added).  Note that § 102(a) creates three
distinct bars for public use, sale, and making the invention otherwise available to
public, i.e., an invention may be in public use without being on sale.  See Dart Indus.,
Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 489 F.2d 1359, 1364–65 (7th Cir. 1973).
This Comment focuses exclusively on the on-sale bar.
40. See, e.g., Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1367–71
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (discussing, but not ruling on, the lower court’s holding that a sale
must be publicly available in order to bar patentability).
41. Id.
42. See id. at 1368 (discussing the argument that “secret sales” do not fall under the AIA).
43. But cf. Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (“The presence or absence of a confidentiality agreement is not dispositive
of the public use issue, but ‘is one factor to be considered in assessing all the
evidence.’” (quoting Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266
(1986)) (emphasis added)).
44. Hobbs v. United States, 451 F.2d 849, 860 (5th Cir. 1971).
45. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d at 1371 (limiting the holding to whether the
distribution agreements at issue were invalidated).
46. See supra notes 20–45 and accompanying text.
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bright-line rule for determining whether the on-sale bar was 
triggered.47 
III. WHY IS THE ON-SALE BAR NEEDED?
The patent system, as a whole, is designed “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”48  Through a patent, the owner 
gains exclusive property rights related to the invention for a limited 
time.49  However, as a tradeoff, the inventor must disclose how to 
make and use the invention to the public.50  In addition, the invention 
becomes part of the public domain at the end of the patent term.51 
The on-sale bar furthers the goal of the patent system: the 
promotion of the “useful arts.”52  It encourages inventors to disclose 
their inventions by denying the exclusive rights that accompany 
patent protection if they do not make an enabling disclosure of their 
inventions in a timely manner.53  Furthermore, it prohibits undue 
extension of exclusive rights by preventing inventors from patenting 
their inventions only after competitors arise.54  In other words, the 
one-year grace period to file creates a balance between the inventor’s 
interest in deciding when to patent an invention and the government’s 
interest in promoting the useful arts.55 
The public has an interest in “obtain[ing] widespread disclosure of 
new inventions . . . as soon as possible.”56  The government-granted 
right to exclude is the incentive that drives disclosure and 
innovation,57 but it also puts a hold on others for the patent’s term.58 
During the patent’s term, anybody who wishes to take advantage of 
the invention must license from the patent owner.59  As a result, the 
patent owner holds the most bargaining power until the patent 
47. See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)–(2) (2015).  These rights include “the right to exclude others
from using, offering for sale or selling [the invention] throughout the United States, or
importing [the invention] into the United States.”  Id. § 154(a)(1).
50. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2015).
51. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945).
52. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
53. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2015); see infra notes 56–62 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 56–57, 67–68 and accompanying text.
56. RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
57. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)–(2) (2015).
59. See id. § 154(a)(1); see also 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2015) (permitting patentees to license
patents).
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expires.60  Only after the patent becomes part of the public domain 
can the public freely take advantage of the inventor’s disclosure.61 
The sooner an invention is patented, the sooner the patent will 
become part of the public domain.62 
A sale of an invention would likely disclose less than the written 
description of the invention from a patent.63  Patents require a written 
description of the claimed invention sufficient to allow a person 
skilled in the pertinent art to make and use the invention.64  However, 
sales do not have this requirement: even if the public had access to 
the invention through sale, the public may not be able to capitalize on 
the invention without further explanation.65  Thus, the public is 
benefited by the inventor’s disclosure that might not have occurred 
but-for the on-sale bar.66 
On the other hand, the inventor has an interest in deciding when to 
patent an invention.67  Inventions oftentimes require large 
investments of capital, and if inventors are unable to test the 
commercial viability of their inventions, they might be discouraged 
from patenting their inventions.68 
60. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972)
(“[S]omeone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from
him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by
the seller.”).
61. Diane H. Crawley, America Invents Act: Promoting Progress or Spurring Secrecy?,
36 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014) (“Once the inventor’s patent rights expire, the public
is free to make and use the invention disclosed in the patent.”).
62. See § 154.  In general, utility patents last for “20 years from the date on which the
application for the patent was filed in the United States.”  Id. § 154(a)(2) (emphasis
added).
63. See infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
64. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2015).
65. See Crawley, supra note 61, at 1 (“[W]here the invention is capable of being kept
secret while being commercially exploited, an inventor must choose between secrecy
and patent protection.”).
66. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
67. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64–65 (1998).
68. See id.  Patent owners have suggested exceptions be created for such commercial
endeavors, to limited success.  See, e.g., Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d
1353, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (rejecting a “supplier” exception to the on-sale bar, which
would “allow inventors to stockpile commercial embodiments of their patented
invention[s] via commercial contracts with suppliers more than a year before they file
their patent application”).
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Even so, the public also has an interest in “prohibiting an extension 
of the period for exploiting the invention.”69  The longer an inventor 
waits to patent an invention, the longer it will take to become part of 
the public domain.70  Likewise, the public has an interest in 
preventing the “removal of inventions from the public domain which 
the public justifiably comes to believe are freely available.”71 
IV. WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE ON-SALE BAR?
A. The USPTO Is Unable to Adequately Enforce the On-Sale Bar
In order to enforce the on-sale bar, the USPTO relies on a general 
duty of disclosure.72  Applicants have “a duty of candor and good 
faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to 
the Office all information known to that individual to be material to 
patentability.”73  Violations of the duty of disclosure result in the 
rejection of the application.74 
Despite this duty and the consequences stemming from it, 
applicants are incentivized to disclose as little information as 
possible, even if it is material to patentability.75  All documents, 
including disclosures of sales, are publicly available after the 
application is published or a patent issued.76  As a result, competitors 
are able to discover valuable information relating to the applicant’s 
potential market and economic standing.77 
Even further, inventions are typically published eighteen months 
after their filing dates, regardless of whether the application thereafter 
becomes abandoned.78  Applicants risk disclosing inventions only to 
69. Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2004), abrogated on other grounds by Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d
665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
70. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2015).
71. Bernhardt, L.L.C., 386 F.3d at 1379.
72. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012).
73. Id.
74. Id. (“[N]o patent will be granted on an application in connection with which fraud on
the Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of disclosure was violated through
bad faith or intentional misconduct.”).
75. See Crawley, supra note 61, at 5 (“One of the costs of seeking patent protection is the
risk that the application for patent will be rejected by the Patent and Trademark Office
. . . .”).
76. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2015).
77. See Crawley, supra note 61, at 5 (“[The] disclosure aspect of patent law holds
particular risks for inventors whose inventions could have been maintained as trade
secrets.”).
78. § 122(b)(1).
2018 The Untimely Death of the On-Sale Bar to Patentability 447 
have their applications rejected.79  In other words, an inventor could 
be left without patent protection, and the public would have an 
enabling disclosure of the inventor’s invention.80  
A morally ambiguous inventor may rather lie to the patent office 
than risk handing an enabling disclosure, sans patent protection, to 
any competitors.81  The patent system should not be set up to 
incentivize immoral conduct. 
B. Administrative Solutions Are Inadequate to Substitute Litigation
Involving the On-Sale Bar
A third party has two general ways to challenge a patent after it has 
issued.82  First, the party may seek judicial determination on the 
patent’s validity or enforceability.83  Second, the party may seek an 
administrative solution with the USPTO.84 
The USPTO offers a variety of proceedings after a patent has 
issued:85 ex parte reexamination,86 post-grant review,87 and inter 
partes review.88  These proceedings allow a petitioner to challenge 
the validity of a patent.89  However, these proceedings often restrict 
the references that a petitioner can use to challenge the patent.90  In 
the context of enforcing the on-sale bar, these proceedings will be 
unavailable in all but the most trivial cases.91  As a result, a potential 
infringer would have to resort to expensive litigation in order to 
challenge a patent.92 
In ex parte reexamination proceedings, any person may challenge a 
patent on the basis of three types of references: issued patents, printed 
79. Crawley, supra note 61, at 5.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 6 (“[O]ur inventor is left worse off than if she had never sought patent
protection . . . .”).
82. See infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
83. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2015).
84. See infra notes 85–112 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.  In addition to the proceedings listed,
the USPTO also oversees another type of proceeding: inter partes reexamination.  37
C.F.R. § 1.913 (2017).  However, because the USPTO is currently in the process of
phasing out this type of proceeding, id., it will not be discussed in this Comment.
86. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2015).
87. 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2015).
88. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2015).
89. §§ 302, 311, 321.
90. Id.
91. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
92. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
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publications, or “statements of the patent owner filed in a proceeding 
before a federal court or the Office in which the patent owner took a 
position on the scope of any claim of a particular patent.”93  
These references largely do not allow a petitioner to challenge a 
patent based on the on-sale bar.94  Regarding printed publications, a 
reference is a printed publication only if a person of ordinary skill in 
the pertinent art “can locate it and recognize and comprehend 
therefrom the essentials of the claimed invention without need of 
further research or experimentation.”95  Thus, any printed publication 
that is sufficient to invalidate a patent under the on-sale bar would be 
sufficient to invalidate the patent under multiple other bars to 
patentability, such as the public-use bar or the requirement that a 
patentable invention be novel.96 
The next type of reference available in ex parte reexamination, a 
separate, previously-issued patent, would likely not disclose sales of 
the challenged patent.97  Likewise, a statement made before a federal 
court or the USPTO would likely not disclose such sales simply 
because the statement would be a flat-out admission that the 
invention is barred from patentability under the on-sale bar.98 
Rather than the above-listed references, a petitioner would likely 
rely on something akin to a proverbial “smoking gun” document 
containing a sale of the invention.99  However, this type of reference 
is likely not admissible in an ex parte reexamination.100  In other 
words, even though such a “smoking gun” would bar patentability if 
revealed during the application process, it cannot be used in ex parte 
reexamination.101 
93. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301(a), 302 (2015).
94. See id. §§ 301, 302.
95. I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 250 F. Supp. 738, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
96. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015).
97. See id.  Ideally, the USPTO would not have allowed the challenged patent if the
previously-issued patent had disclosed sales of the invention in the challenged patent.
98. See §§ 102, 301–302.
99. See, e.g., Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(invalidating a patent based on an order for 20,000 units of the claimed invention).
100. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.  Note that emails are likely not
“printed publications” under the patent code.  See supra notes 94–97 and
accompanying text.
101. See § 102.  In the context of applying for a patent, an email would not be considered a
printed publication, but rather evidence of a sale predating the critical on-sale bar
date.  See Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng’g Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1575 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (“[T]he inventor’s attempted exploitation must be objectively manifested as a
definite sale or offer to sell the invention.”).
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Another type of administrative proceeding is post-grant review.102 
In post-grant review, a third party may challenge a patent on any 
ground of patentability.103  Notably, post-grant review is not limited 
to patent and printed publications, unlike ex parte reexamination.104 
However, a petitioner must request post-grant review on or before 
nine months from the grant of a patent or the issuance of a re-issued 
patent.105  Depending on the market, nine months may not be enough 
time to discover and initiate a proceeding against the patent owner.106 
The last type of relevant administrative proceedings is inter partes 
review.107  The petition for inter partes review can only be filed after 
nine months from the grant of the patent or at the termination of a 
post-grant review.108  In other words, the time for filing a petition for 
an inter partes review begins just as the time to file a petition for a 
post-grant review ends.109  
Inter partes review is significantly more limited than post-grant 
review.110  Inter partes review is limited to challenges based on the 
novelty or non-obviousness of the invention, and the petition can 
only be based on patents or printed publications.111  Thus, like ex 
parte reexamination, inter partes review largely does not allow a 
petition to challenge a patent on the basis of the on-sale bar.112 
Taking into account all of these proceedings, the result is that even 
if a third party had a proverbial “smoking gun” that would preclude 
patentability under the on-sale bar, the only administrative solution 
available is post-grant review.113  However, the window to file a 
102. 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2015).
103. Id. § 321(b).
104. Id.; 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–302 (2015).
105. Id. § 321(c).
106. See, e.g., Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 989, 991, 993 (C.D. Cal.
2000) (ruling on the validity of a patent originally issued in 1995 in a lawsuit filed in
1999).
107. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2015).
108. Id. § 311(c).
109. Id.
110. Compare id. § 311(b) (allowing for inter partes review only if the challenge is based
on novelty or non-obviousness objections using only patents and printed publications
as references), with § 321(b) (allowing for post-grant review under several conditions
provided in 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)–(3) (2015)).
111. § 311(b).
112. Compare id. (allowing petitioners to cite only patents and printed publications as
references in inter partes review), with 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–302 (2015) (allowing
petitioners to cite only patents, printed publications, and statements of the patent
owner as prior art references in ex parte reexamination).
113. See supra notes 99–112 and accompanying text.
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petition for post-grant review closes a mere nine months after the 
patent has been granted.114  If someone wanted to challenge a patent 
based on the on-sale bar, that person would be limited to litigation.115 
Administrative proceedings are intended to be a low-cost, faster 
alternative to litigation,116 but precluding the on-sale bar limits their 
applicability.117 
C. During Litigation, the Intent Requirement for the Affirmative
Defense of Inequitable Conduct Is Too High for the On-Sale Bar
Another problem with the on-sale bar is its enforceability in 
litigation.118  In order to attack a wrongfully-obtained patent based on 
the on-sale bar, a challenger must show that the invention was sold 
before the critical date.119  From there, the challenger has two 
options.120  First, the challenger could analyze each claim of the 
patent and show that the prior sale had foreclosed patentability of the 
individual claims to the invention.121  The challenger would have to 
repeat this analysis for each claim of the patent.122  The apparent 
problem with this approach is that patents can have an unlimited 
number of claims.123  A challenger runs the risk that this route will 
invalidate only some, but not all, of the relevant claims of the 
114. § 321(c).
115. See Crawley, supra note 61, at 11–13.
116. See, e.g., Samson Vermont, AIPLA Survey of Costs of Patent Litigation and Inter
Partes Review, PAT. ATT’Y (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.patentattorney.com/aipla-
survey-of-costs-of-patent-litigation-and-inter-partes-review/.  As of this writing, the
cost for filing a request for ex parte reexamination is a mere $12,000 for large entities.
37 C.F.R. § 1.20(c)(1) (2013).
117. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 119–42 and accompanying text.
119. Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (invalidating
a patent based on sales more than one year before filing an application for patent).
120. See infra notes 121–42 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Special Devices, Inc., 270 F.3d at 1354 (challenging claims 1–9 of the patent
at issue).
122. See id.
123. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,404,263 (filed Mar. 10, 1993) (issued Apr. 4, 1995)
(demonstrating that the patent invalidated in Special Devices, Inc. had twenty-four
total claims).  The basic filing fee alone allows the application to claim up to three
independent claims and up to twenty total claims.  37 C.F.R. § 1.16(h)–(i) (2015).
Applicants can add as many claims as they would like for a nominal fee.  See id.
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patent.124  In addition, this route significantly increases the cost and 
expense of litigation.125 
The second option would be to accuse the patent owner of 
inequitable conduct while applying for the patent.126  A finding of 
inequitable conduct renders the entire patent unenforceable.127  In 
other words, instead of challenging each claim in the patent 
individually, if merely one claim was granted as a result of 
inequitable conduct, then all of the claims are invalid.128  The defense 
of inequitable conduct acts as a deterrent effect against misconduct. 
In order for the court to find inequitable conduct, the claimant must 
prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence.129  First, the 
claimant must show that the applicant had the specific intent to 
deceive the USPTO.130  Second, the claimant must show “but-for” 
materiality: that the patent was granted as a result of the deception.131  
The test for inequitable conduct requires the claimant to prove that 
the applicant had the specific intent to deceive the USPTO.132  This 
element requires that the claimant “prove that the applicant actually 
knew that . . . the USPTO would not allow a patent claim if the 
USPTO had been aware of the undisclosed information.”133  Proving 
that the applicant should have known is insufficient.134 
Imagine the “smoking gun” document mentioned previously.135 
Would that be enough to show specific intent?  In many situations, 
likely not.136  For example, a large multinational organization would 
likely have a research-and-development department, legal 
124. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 120 (1853) (invalidating only one
claim of the patent at issue).
125. See RICHARD W. GOLDSTEIN & DONIKA P. PENTCHEVA, AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW
ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 37 (2015), http://files.ctctcdn.com/e79ee27
4201/b6ced6c3-d1ee-4ee7-9873-352dbe08d8fd.pdf (reporting that median litigation
costs at the end of discovery ranged from $400,000 to $3,000,000 in 2015).
126. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
127. Id. at 1288.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1287.
130. Id. at 1290.
131. Id. at 1291.
132. Id. at 1290.
133. Sam S. Han, Therasense Nonsense, 37 U. DAYTON L. REV. 185, 192 (2012) (emphasis
added).
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 99, 101 and accompanying text.
136. See Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1290–91 (“[W]hen there are multiple reasonable
inferences that may be drawn, intent to deceive cannot be found.”).
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department, sales team, and a host of others.137  If the sales team sold 
the invention, who could say that the patent attorney or the inventor 
knew about it?138  Certainly not the defendant in an infringement 
case.139 
A higher standard for finding inequitable conduct changes the risk-
benefit analysis for the applicant.140  A higher standard for 
inequitable conduct means the courts will see fewer inequitable 
conduct defenses raised, and as a result, fewer patents will be held 
unenforceable.141  In other words, a higher standard decreases the risk 
to the morally ambiguous applicant while keeping the benefits high: 
the exclusive rights relating to an otherwise-unobtainable patent for 
twenty years.142 
V. NON-PUBLIC SALES SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN
THE ON-SALE BAR
One response to the USPTO’s inability to enforce the on-sale bar is 
to narrow the scope of the bar.143  Excluding non-public sales would 
suit the interests of both the government and inventors.144 
Furthermore, excluding non-public sales would have the benefit of 
not disturbing inventions already in the public domain.145  Even 
though such a change would reduce the number of references 
available to reject applications, it will not have a negative impact on 
the patent system.146 
Excluding non-public sales would balance the government’s 
interest in public disclosure and the inventor’s interest in being able 
to control when to patent an invention.147  This solution contains an 
internal check: sales subject to secrecy requirements oftentimes lack 
137. See, e.g., Board of Directors, SHELL GLOBAL, https://www.shell.com/about-
us/leadership/board-of-directors.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2018).
138. Cf. The Driven-Well Cases, 123 U.S. 267, 272 (1887) (holding that the inventor’s
consent to the sale is irrelevant to the on-sale bar).
139. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (requiring discovery requests to be proportional, relevant,
and non-privileged).
140. See Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1288 (raising the standard for finding inequitable
conduct in order to limit “discovery into corporate practices” and to decrease “the
complexity, duration and cost of patent infringement litigation”).
141. See id.
142. See id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2015) (providing the twenty-year term limit for
an issued patent).
143. See supra notes 38–45 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 147–51 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.
147. See Lindholm, supra note 17.
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the publicity to generate significant income.148  Thus, the 
government’s interest in widespread public disclosure is not 
precluded by allowing inventors to sell their inventions secretly.149 
This solution is also beneficial to the patent owner.  The patent 
owner need no longer worry about revealing confidential negotiations 
during the application process.150  Likewise, if the patent owner was 
subject to a lawsuit, less would need to be revealed during discovery, 
as confidential sales would no longer be relevant to any charges of 
inequitable conduct.151 
This solution would not disturb inventions in the public domain.152 
Since non-public inventions are, by definition, not available to the 
public, there is no worry about pulling inventions out of the public 
domain.153  In addition, inventors would not be significantly 
incentivized to keep their inventions secret because non-public sales 
are not able to generate significant income standing alone.154  
The consequence of this solution is that it reduces the amount of 
references that the USPTO can use to reject patent applications.155 
However, this restriction on available references would not have a 
negative impact on the patent system.156  Rather, excluding non-
public sales would incentivize disclosure of new works because non-
public sales are often used to secure a manufacturer for the 
invention.157  Thus, even though the number of available references 
148. See Crawley, supra note 61, at 5–6 (discussing trade secrets and noting that they
deprive society “of the disclosure of the invention”).  However, notably, some high-
price, low-quantity items may be excluded from the internal check discussed above.
Though, because of their infrequent sales and small market sizes, these items may be
better suited for trade secret protections rather than patent protection.  See Tamara
Monosoff, To Patent or Not to Patent?, ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 26, 2005), https://www.
entrepreneur.com/article/80088.
149. See supra notes 56–68 and accompanying text.
150. Non-public sales are, by definition, subject to secrecy.  Hobbs v. United States, 451
F.2d 849, 860 (5th Cir. 1971).
151. See supra notes 132–39 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
153. See Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (quoting Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1301
(Fed. Cir. 2002)), abrogated on other grounds by Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa,
Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
154. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Meds. Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 827 F.3d 1363, 1374–75, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (finding that private sales for manufacturing services only, in which the
inventor maintains control of the invention, does not trigger the on-sale bar).
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to reject a patent decreases, excluding non-public sales should have a 
positive effect on the government’s goal: to incentivize the disclosure 
of inventors.158 
VI. THE USPTO SHOULD ALLOW PETITIONERS TO SUBMIT
EVIDENCE RELATED TO THE ON-SALE BAR IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS CHALLENGING THE
VALIDITY OF A PATENT
Currently, administrative proceedings largely do not encompass the 
on-sale bar because available references are inapplicable in all 
proceedings except post-grant review.159  Therefore, the USPTO 
should expand the scope of these proceedings to allow petitioners to 
submit evidence relating to the on-sale bar.160  Expanding the scope 
of administrative proceedings would decrease the USPTO’s cost of 
enforcing the on-sale bar.161  Allowing evidence related to the on-sale 
bar in these proceedings would also increase the effectiveness of the 
on-sale bar.162  In addition, the negative consequences for allowing 
the submission of evidence related to the on-sale bar are negligible.163 
Allowing petitioners to submit evidence related to the on-sale bar 
shifts some of the cost of enforcing the on-sale bar from the USPTO 
to those who have a specific interest in challenging the validity of a 
patent.164  The USPTO lacks the resources to investigate every patent 
application for compliance with the on-sale bar.165  Furthermore, 
those with a specific interest in the validity of a patent likely have 
greater access to information relating to the on-sale bar compared to 
the USPTO.166  Thus, shifting the costs increases the efficiency of 
enforcing the on-sale bar.167 
The danger is that companies may file frivolous petitions in order 
to throw monkey wrenches into their competitors’ patents.168 
Certainly, with their lower cost, administrative proceedings seem like 
158. See supra notes 146, 148–49, 152–54 and accompanying text.
159. See supra Section IV.B.
160. See infra notes 161–78 and accompanying text.
161. See supra Section IV.A.
162. See infra notes 164–67 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 168–76 and accompanying text.
164. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.20 (2013).
165. See supra Section IV.A.
166. See, e.g., Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(explaining that the patent owner did not disclose a sale of 20,000 units of the
invention but the manufacturer of the units did).
167. See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text.
168. Cf. Crawley, supra note 61, at 13 (explaining that administrative proceedings increase
the cost of enforcing a patent).
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a more viable option than litigation.169  However, because these 
proceedings require pleading with particularity, frivolous petitions 
are unlikely to meet this standard for issues relating to the on-sale 
bar.170 
Another danger comes with allowing more evidence in 
administrative proceedings: the danger that inventors will forego 
patent protection altogether in favor of trade secret protection.171 
Allowing more evidence makes administrative proceedings more 
petitioner-friendly, increasing the risk that the patent will be 
invalidated and altering the inventor’s cost-benefit analysis.172  If 
inventors feel that patent protection is too weak, they will opt for 
trade secret protection or no protection in lieu of patent protection.173 
As a result, the public is denied an enabling disclosure of the 
invention,174 and the inventor must spend resources protecting the 
invention because the inventor lacks the exclusive rights that 
accompany patent protection.175  As one commentator states, “When 
an inventor chooses not to patent her invention, and instead opts for 
trade secret protection, the progress of science and the useful arts is 
impeded, not promoted.”176 
However, even with an exception carved out for the on-sale bar, the 
evidence submitted in administrative proceedings is more restricted 
than what would be admissible in litigation.177  In addition, the 
USPTO requires a petitioner to submit “evidence that supports the 
grounds for the challenge to each claim” before the petition is even 
considered.178 
169. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
170. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 302, 312, 322 (2015).
171. See Crawley, supra note 61, at 7 (“The . . . [AIA] makes patent protection less
attractive by making patents . . . more vulnerable to post-grant challenges . . . .”).
172. See id.
173. Id. at 7–8.
174. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2015).
175. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(4)(ii) (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1985), http://www.uniformlaws.org
/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf (requiring that trade secrets be
“subject . . . [to] efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy”).
176. Crawley, supra note 61, at 6.
177. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2015) (limiting inter partes review to novelty and non-
obviousness grounds and “only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or
printed publications”).
178. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (2015).
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VII. THE STANDARD FOR FINDING INEQUITABLE
CONDUCT SHOULD BE LOWERED FOR THE ON-SALE
BAR
The specific intent requirement for finding inequitable conduct 
should be lowered for the on-sale bar.179  Rather than the “actual 
knowledge” standard required for the affirmative defense, the 
requirement should apply an objective “should have known” standard 
for the on-sale bar.180  This standard, coupled with “but-for” 
materiality, does not make the defense susceptible to abuse.181  In 
addition, lowering the intent standard for the on-sale bar would not 
have the same negative effects as lowering the standard for other 
avenues for a patent examiner’s rejection of an application.182  Lastly, 
supplemental examination, a new type of administrative proceeding 
available to patent owners, would help alleviate the burden on the 
patent owner due to the “should have known” standard.183 
Lowering the standard lessens the burden on the claimant 
supporting the inequitable conduct defense184 and would make it 
more akin to the way the USPTO would enforce the bar.185  The 
USPTO does not consider intent when making a rejection based on 
the on-sale bar.186  Rather, it is a bright line rule: either the invention 
was sold before the critical on-sale bar date, or it was not.187  A 
defendant in an infringement suit should not have a significantly 
higher standard in this case than what is required by the USPTO 
when the applicant applied for a patent in such a situation.188 
Lowering the standard does not make the defense susceptible to 
abuse.189  Discovery would be limited to documents pertaining to 
179. See supra Section IV.C.
180. See Han, supra note 133, at 189, 191–92.
181. See infra notes 184–90 and accompanying text.
182. See infra notes 184–93 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 194–97 and accompanying text.
184. See Han, supra note 133, at 191–92.
185. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015).
186. See id.
187. Id.
188. Rejections based on the on-sale bar can be distinguished from some of the other types
of rejections because the on-sale bar does not rely heavily on the reasoning of the
patent examiner.  Compare § 102(a)(1) (setting forth the on-sale bar), with 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 (2015) (stating the requirement that patentable inventions be non-obvious).
189. Contra Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (raising the standard for finding inequitable conduct in order to limit “discovery
into corporate practices” and to decrease “the complexity, duration and cost of patent
infringement litigation”).
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sales of the invention over a year before the filing date of the 
application.190 
The complaint that patent examiners are overloaded with prior art 
references191 likely does not hold for the on-sale bar because few 
documents are needed to support a rejection based on the on-sale 
bar.192  Something as simple as a commercial invoice would satisfy 
the applicant’s duty to disclose information related to the on-sale 
bar.193 
The AIA has also introduced a new method to absolve a patent 
owner’s duty to disclose: supplemental examination.194  If the patent 
owner requests supplemental examination, the USPTO will 
“consider, reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant 
to the patent.”195  In other words, the patent owner can request a 
supplemental examination in order to disclose information that 
should have been disclosed during the application process.196  As a 
result, the supplemental examination blocks all defenses “based upon 
information that was considered, reconsidered, or corrected pursuant 
to a supplemental examination request.”197 
The on-sale bar to patentability bars only the specific version of the 
invention that was placed on sale.198  However, a patent can contain 
multiple variations of an invention.199  Thus, after a patent has issued, 
if the patent owner later discovers a sale that the owner should have 
known, the owner can cancel the claims to the invention that was 
placed on sale.200  This situation is preferable to a charge of 
inequitable conduct, which would invalidate the entire patent, 
regardless of which variation of the invention was on sale.201  In 
addition, the public is benefited by the patent owner’s self-regulation 
of claims that should not have been patented.202 
190. See § 102(b)(1) (stating that sales “made 1 year or less before the effective filing date
of a claimed invention shall not be prior art”).
191. Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1289.
192. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
194. 35 U.S.C. § 257 (2015).
195. Id. § 257(a).
196. Id.
197. Id. § 257(c)(2)(B).
198. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015).
199. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2015).
200. See § 257.
201. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288–89 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
202. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The on-sale bar is one of the ways that Congress has implemented 
the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution by 
requiring inventors to timely file an application if they wish to 
receive patent protection.203  If the provision does not fulfill its 
objectives, then it should be modified to do so.204  Any proposed 
changes should account for the interplay between patent prosecution 
and patent litigation.205  Thus, a three-part approach is likely the best 
and most comprehensive solution: (1) excluding private sales from 
the on-sale bar,206 (2) expanding administrative proceedings to 
include evidence pertaining to the on-sale bar,207 and (3) lowering the 
standard for finding inequitable conduct for the on-sale bar.208 
203. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
204. See supra Part III.
205. See supra Section IV.C.
206. See supra Part V.
207. See supra Part VI.
208. See supra Part VII.
